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Global Community
I. INTRODUCTION

As the process of globalization continues, the world is starting to
resemble a single community with a shared economy, culture, and
knowledge. However, the effects of globalization do not necessarily
translate into positive outcomes. The U.S. subprime mortgage crisis,
for example, has driven the entire world into a difficult economic
recession. This crisis not only demonstrates how closely integrated
the world economy has become, but also demonstrates the need for a
global legal system that can promote harmonious co-prosperity.
Every nation has a legal system that reflects its national culture.
Historically, most political structures involved some form of
monarchy, but democratic political structures are much more
common today. In modern democracies, legal systems are designed
to reflect the opinion of the nation’s people through the mechanism
of voting. A democratic legal system, however, is not always
reflective of a nation’s traditional culture. Indeed, as the culture of a
nation changes, its legal system often changes with it. This principle
can be observed through the global trend toward democratic
governance, which has led many nations to implement democratic
processes that are often very different from their traditional political
systems. Because a unified legal system facilitates cultural and legal
harmony between nations and because such harmony is essential to
the development of the global community and economy, it is likely
the current trend towards democratic governance will continue in the
future.
It is difficult to imagine the development of the global economy
without the development of a corresponding global legal system
because the two concepts are so interconnected. Accordingly,
organizations that facilitate harmony among global legal systems are
becoming increasingly important. These international organizations
help to unify the global community in a number of areas, and they are
likely to be increasingly necessary in the future as a new international
legal system emerges. Furthermore, as the global community
becomes more economically integrated, it is expected that the need
for military power will greatly diminish. As trade barriers between
states decrease, enterprises have little, if any, need for military
support to conduct business in other states. Below is a table
displaying current military expenditures for a host of countries as a
percentage of global military spending.1

1
Military
Spending
Worldwide,
VISUAL
ECONOMICS,
http://www.visualeconomics.com/military-spending-worldwide/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2010).
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Spending in Dollars

Global Military
Spending

United States

$711 billion

48%

Central and South
America

$30 billion

2%

Latin America

$39 billion

3%

Sub-Saharan Africa

$10 billion

1%

Russia

$70 billion

5%

Middle East and North
Africa

$82 billion

5%

East Asia and
Australasia

$120 billion

8%

China

$122 billion

8%

Europe

$289 billion

20%

As the table shows, countries spend an enormous amount of
funds on military expenditures—funds that could be used for other
more beneficial purposes. The existence of excessive military power
increases the risk of global conflict. Accordingly, the global
community should manage world military power under a common
legal system. But, for such a system to work, the global community
would need to agree on a set of rules to govern the system.
A similar approach should be taken in developing a global
economy. While military power was the dominant force of the past,
economic power is much more influential today. Thus, because the
basis of economic power is cooperation, it is essential that the global
community comply with rules established by an international legal
system for humankind to prosper in the future. This Article will focus
on the creation of a global legal system to promote global economic
development. Specifically, the Article will address the following
three topics: the development of global organizations, economic and
legal systems, and international legislation.2

2
A fourth topic, harmonizing tax treaties and domestic laws, will be discussed in related
article anticipated to be published in the Spring 2011 issue of the Brigham Young University
International Law & Management Review.
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF GLOBAL ORGANIZATIONS
Just as every nation has a domestic legal system for its national
administration, the international community needs a legal system for
its international administration. Since every nation has a different
cultural and historical background, it is not easy to create a unified
legal system that satisfies each country’s needs. Nevertheless, the
international community has made an effort to create a legal system
that harmonizes the cultural and historical differences between
nations, and as a result of these efforts, international organizations
like the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, and the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development have
been created. These international organizations are currently
performing the global community’s most important functions.
A. The United Nations
Military power has historically been the deciding factor in world
politics. In the absence of an effective international rule against wars
of aggression, it was common for stronger nations to invade weaker
nations more or less at will. Indeed, there was little reason for the
stronger nations to exercise restraint. This unchecked power resulted
in countless tragedies, and eventually the international community
realized the importance of a mechanism that could facilitate
international cooperation in the pursuit of peace. On June 26, 1945,
just such a mechanism was created in the form of the United Nations
(U.N.) Charter (U.N. Charter). The U.N. Charter, which consists of a
preamble and 111 articles, continues to play an important function in
the operation of the international community, and as of January 1,
2009, there are 197 U.N. member states.
Article 1 of the U.N. Charter provides:
The purposes of the U.N. are
1) To maintain international peace and security,
and to that end: to take effective collective
measures for the prevention and removal of
threats to the peace, and for the suppression
of acts of aggression or other breaches of the
peace, and to bring about by peaceful means,
and in conformity with the principles of
justice and international law, adjustment or
settlement of international disputes or
situations which might lead to a breach of the
peace;
74
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2) To develop friendly relations among nations
based on respect for the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples, and
to take other appropriate measures to
strengthen universal peace;
3) To achieve international co-operation in
solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian
character, and in promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race,
sex, language, or religion; and
4) To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of
nations in the attainment of these common
ends.3
It seems clear that the U.N. should play an increasingly important
role in the international community’s efforts toward peaceful
coexistence.
B. The World Trade Organization
The World Trade Organization (WTO) was established on
January 1, 1995, as a result of the Uruguay Round negotiations
between 1986 and 1994. As of January 1, 2009, the WTO has 153
member states. The WTO is the only international organization that
deals with “the rules of trade between nations.”4 WTO agreements
are negotiated and signed by most of “the world’s trading nations and
ratified in their parliaments.”5 The goal of WTO agreements is to
“help producers of goods and services, exporters, and importers
conduct their business.”6
The global community needs the WTO to assist in creating an
open trading system. But what is the value of an open trading system,
and why should the global community strive to achieve it? The WTO
posits the following argument:
The economic case for an open trading system
based on internationally accepted rules rests largely
3
U.N. Charter art. 1, available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml
(last visited Oct. 25, 2010).
4
What
is
the
WTO?,
WORLD
TRADE
ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2010).
5
Id.
6
Id.
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on commercial common sense and the experience of
world trade and economic growth since World War
II. Tariffs on industrial products have fallen steeply
and now average less than five percent in industrial
countries. During the first twenty-five years after
World War II, world economic growth averaged
about five percent per year, and this high rate was at
least partly the result of lowering trade barriers.
World trade grew even faster during this period,
averaging about eight percent per year. The data
show an unmistakable statistical link between lower
trade barriers and economic growth, and this link is
supported by economic theory. All countries have
assets — human, industrial, natural, and financial —
that they can employ to produce goods and services
for their domestic markets or for export. Economic
theory predicts that nations “can benefit when these
goods and services are traded.”7
Thus, the WTO should continue to play an important role in the
global economy and the development of a global legal system,
especially since the WTO is already established in so many nations.
C. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) describes itself as bringing together “the governments of
countries committed to democracy and the market economy from
around the world” in order to accomplish the following aims:
1) Support sustainable economic growth
2) Boost employment
3) Raise living standards
4) Maintain financial stability
5) Assist other countries' economic development
6) Contribute to growth in world trade8
Since it was established in 1961, the OECD has facilitated the
sharing of expertise and the exchange of views between more than
100 countries, including Brazil, China, Russia, and many of the leastdeveloped countries in Africa. For more than forty years, the OECD
7
Understanding
the
WTO,
WORLD
TRADE
ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact3_e.htm.
8
About
OECD,
ORG.
FOR
ECON.
CO-OPERATION
&
DEV.,
http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36734103_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited
Oct. 25, 2010).
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has been one of the world’s largest and most reliable sources
of economic and social data. In addition to collecting data, the OECD
monitors
trends
and
analyzes
forecasts and
economic
developments. It researches social changes and evolving patterns in
trade, the environment, agriculture, technology, taxation, and
more. The organization provides a setting where governments can
compare experiences, seek answers to common problems, identify
good practices, and coordinate domestic and international policies.
As of January 1, 2009, the OECD had thirty member states.
In May 2007, OECD countries agreed to invite Chile, Estonia, Israel,
Russia, and Slovenia to open discussions for membership. At the
same time, the OECD also offered enhanced engagement with an eye
toward future membership to Brazil, China, Indonesia, and South
Africa. Because of the OECD’s ever increasing and significant role in
governance, it should play an equally important role in creating a
global legal system.
D. Summary
These organizations have the potential to be important players in
the effort to create a legal system that would facilitate the
development of the global community. The UN Charter, WTO
agreements, and the OECD Model Tax Convention should become a
part of any global legal system that may be established. Furthermore,
just as a strong democratic society needs a good legal system and
popular support in order to guarantee the well-being of its people, the
global community needs a strong legal system in order to facilitate
prosperity. Before a similarly successful and strong international
legal system can be developed, however, it is important to understand
how to create such a system.
III. ECONOMIC AND LEGAL SYSTEMS
A. The Economic Efficiency of a Rule
In a society controlled by rules, economic activities are carried
out under the auspices of the legal system. That is to say, the
economic activities of enterprises and individuals are carried out
within the scope of the state’s economic policy, and the economic
policy of a state is made to be in harmony with the laws of the state.
This means that economic activities are governed by rules.
In order to encourage efficiency, rules must be developed from
an economic perspective, which means considering the probable
social benefit, expense, and corruption effect of a proposed rule. This
issue will be discussed further in Chapter IV under the heading,
“From the Regulatory Perspective.”
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In a modern society, where cross-border and local transactions
are closely integrated, it is very natural for most economic activities
to be performed under an integrated system of domestic and
international rules. Cross-border transactions by multinational
enterprises are especially affected by the national economic policies
of the states implicated in these transactions and by international
economic rules—global economic policies—made by international
organizations like the WTO and the OECD. Because so many
organizations are involved in cross-border transactions, creating
economically efficient international rules is vitally important.
B. Role of the Government
Enterprises and governments often have different goals,
particularly in an economic context. While enterprises attempt to
maximize profits, the primary objective of government is to balance
public finances. Nevertheless, governments should make an effort to
create economic circumstances that enable enterprises to pursue
profit maximization. In a free-market society where economic
activities are performed based on consensual transactions, the
government needs to create legal rules that facilitate a spirit of fair
competition. When fair competition exists, an enterprise’s economic
activities can contribute to society’s development.
To create the best economic circumstances in a democratic
society, the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary should
coordinate their efforts. The legislature should make rules that
produce the best economic circumstances possible. The executive
should fairly implement those rules. And, finally, the judiciary
should decide whether a violation of those rules has occurred. When
the branches of government all work together, rules are created and
enforced in a way that allows enterprises to perform their economic
activities in accordance with principles of fair competition, without
harming the economy.
C. Role of International Organizations
The role of international organizations is becoming increasingly
more important as transnational activities increase. Although the
international community currently has no political structure
comparable to what is found in individual states, international
organizations are playing an important role in the international
community. For example, agreements and model tax conventions
made by the WTO and the OECD significantly affect transnational
activities.
Just as tax treaties promote international transactions by
smoothing out the differences between the tax laws of contracting
78
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states, rules such as the model tax conventions and countless other
rules synthesized by international organizations do serve and will
serve a similar function. For now, however, legal conflicts between
domestic law and international norms often create difficulties for
enterprises. Therefore, in order for the global community to develop,
the study of legal conflict avoidance is essential.
IV. DRAFTING INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION
A. Established Purpose of International Organizations
The U.N., the WTO, and the OECD focus on world peace,
fundamental human rights, and global economic development. The
preamble of the U.N. Charter reads:
We the peoples of the United Nations determined to
save succeeding generations from the scourge of
war…and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human
rights [and] in the dignity and worth of the human
person…to establish conditions under which justice
and respect for the obligations arising from treaties
and other sources of international law can be
maintained, and to promote social progress and
better standards of life in larger freedom….9
The WTO’s General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
1947 states:
[The parties to this treaty,] [r]ecognizing that their
relations in the field of trade and economic
endeavour should be conducted with a view to
raising standards of living, ensuring full employment
and a large and steadily growing volume of real
income and effective demand, developing the full
use of the resources of the world and expanding the
production and exchange of goods, [b]eing desirous
of contributing to these objectives by entering into
reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements
directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and
other barriers to trade and to the elimination of
discriminatory treatment in international commerce,

9
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[h]ave through their Representatives agree [to enter
into this treaty].10
Furthermore, in Article 1 of the Convention,11 the OECD
committed itself to promoting policies designed to:
[A]chieve the highest sustainable economic growth
and employment and a rising standard of living in
member countries, while maintaining financial
stability, and thus to contribute to the development
of the world economy; to contribute to sound
economic expansion in member as well as nonmember countries in the process of economic
development; and to contribute to the expansion of
world trade on a multilateral, non-discriminatory
basis in accordance with international obligations.12
According to the founding documents of these organizations,
they were established to promote world peace, fundamental human
rights, and global economic development.
B. Legislative Approach
Economic development, whether domestic or international, is
highly emphasized and valued in modern society. Accordingly,
economic development has become the primary goal for most states.
This section will discuss the importance of Free Trade Agreements
(FTAs) and tax treaties to both domestic and international economic
development, and will also explore the equity of taxing rights among
states. Furthermore, because states and international organizations
pursue economic development through a variety of activities that are
regulated by a set of corresponding rules and regulations, this section
will explore a desirable mechanism for regulation and will emphasize
the need for states to consider the negative economic effects of
unproductive rules at the time of legislation.
1) FTAs, Tax Treaties, and Taxing Rights
Historically, human society has suffered from war, famine, and
disease. Economic development has eased much of this suffering. As

10
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade pmbl., Oct. 30, 1947, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_e.pdf [hereinafter GATT].
11
The Convention was signed in Paris on December 14, 1960. See Convention on the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development pmbl., Dec. 14, 1960, available at
http://www.oecd.org/document/7/0,3343,en_2649_ 20118 51915847_1_1_1_1,00.html.
12
Id. art. 1.
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such, society must continue to work toward economic development
to alleviate human suffering.
In the past, developed countries often used military power to
open new markets in underdeveloped countries and exploit them for
economic profit. Today, it is no longer necessary to use military
power to open a new market. As voluntary and tax-free international
transactions increase, multi-national enterprises can conduct business
almost anywhere without commercial barriers. Multi-national
enterprises rarely encounter significant oversight from government
regarding their business activities in other countries. Instead, these
enterprises are primarily governed by the legislative activities of
international organizations.13
In light of the growing desire to develop an international
economy, international organizations should go to great lengths to
promote the free cross-border business activities of multi-national
enterprises. To do this, international organizations should support the
extension of FTAs and tax treaties, as well as equity in taxing rights
between nations.
a) Extension of Free Trade Agreements
During the first twenty-five years after World War II, world
economic growth averaged about five percent per year—a high rate
of growth which was partly the result of lower trade barriers. World
trade grew even faster, averaging approximately eight percent during
the same period. Because data show a definite statistical link between
freer trade and economic growth, the global community should
promote free trade to bolster economic development worldwide.14
One way to promote free trade is through trade agreements.
Trade agreements help open markets and expand opportunities for
workers and businesses. In short, they can help enterprises enter and
compete more easily in the global marketplace. Trade agreements are
also a tool for promoting fair competition and encouraging foreign
governments to adopt open and transparent rulemaking procedures as
well as non-discriminatory laws and regulations. Trade agreements
can enhance the business environment by including terms that
resolve issues that are of concern to businesses as well as terms that
reduce or eliminate tariffs.
13
Since the need for developed countries to use military power to open up new markets
has decreased substantially, and international organizations are now strengthening free crossborder transactions, current military power should be used to perform a police function to
ensure the peace and well-being of the global community. If this becomes the case, current
military expenditures borne by each state will greatly decrease. When economic interchange
between states (especially between Islamic and developed states) is enabled, conflicts deriving
from cultural differences between these states will decrease significantly.
14
See U.S. Free Trade Agreements, EXPORT.GOV., http://www.export.gov/fta/ (last visited
Oct. 25, 2010).
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In light of the recent promulgation of Regional Trade
Agreements (RTAs) around the world, the WTO stated the
following:
[RTAs] have become a very prominent feature of
the Multilateral Trading System (MTS). The surge
in RTAs has continued unabatedly since the early
1990s. As of 31 July 2010, some 474 RTAs,
counting goods and services notifications
separately, have been notified to the GATT/WTO.
Of these, 351 RTAs were notified under Article
XXIV of the GATT 1947 or GATT 1994; 31 under
the Enabling Clause; and 92 under Article V of the
GATS. At that same date, 283 agreements were in
force.… The overall number of RTAs in force has
been increasingly [sic] steadily, a trend likely to be
strengthened by the many RTAs currently under
negotiations [sic]. Of these RTAs, Free Trade
Agreements (FTAs) and partial scope agreements
account for ninety percent, while customs unions
account for ten percent...15
To understand the real economic effect of FTAs, it is helpful to
observe the relevant statistics. The chart below reflects the growth
from 2007-08 in U.S. exports to its trade agreement partners:16

15
Regional
Trade
Agreements,
WORLD
TRADE
ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2008).
16
See U.S. Free Trade Agreements, supra note 14 (“The United States is party to many
bi-lateral and multi-lateral trade agreements. Countries with which the U.S. has active bi-lateral
trade agreements include: Australia, Bahrain, Chile, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Peru, Oman, and
Singapore. The active multi-lateral trade agreements that the U.S. has signed include the North
American Free-Trade Agreement and the Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade
Agreement (CAFTA-DR). The U.S. is also party to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT, overseen by the WTO) along with 152 other countries. U.S. trade agreements
with Panama, Korea, and Columbia are pending congressional approval. The U.S. is also in
negotiations on trade agreements with Malaysia, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, and the
Southern African Customs Union (SACU) which includes Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South
Africa, and Swaziland.”).
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Growth in U.S. Exports (2007
(2007-2008)
Percent Change from 2007-2008
2007

0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1

Israel
Canada
NAFTA
El Salvador
Dominican Rep
Honduras
Jordan
Singapore
Mexico
CAFTA-DR
Morocco
Guatemala
Australia
Costa Rica
Nicaragua
Oman
Bahrain
Chile
Peru
Total

Percentage

0

Country
As the chart above clearly demonstrates, FTAs can help increase
trade between nations. Thus, it is necessary to promote the further
extension of FTAs to drive economic development in the global
community. To promote FTAs, International organizations should
make an effort to build up a system of legal rules that will help break
down trade barriers.
b) Extension of Tax Treaties
Presumably, the promulgation of FTAs will result in more crosscross
border transactions between states and consequently increase global
wealth.
th. However, even though states execute FTAs, such execution
might result in the taxation of cross-border
cross
transactions by each state.
In this double taxation scenario, FTAs may not be enough to promote
increased cross-border
border transactions. Thus, to promote global
economic development, states and international organizations should
attempt to prevent instances of double taxation through tax treaties.
To illustrate how a tax treaty could help prevent double taxation
of cross-border
border transactions, consider the following
fo
example:
Assume that a Korean multi-national
multi
enterprise (X) is doing
business worldwide and has a branch (Y)
( in the United States. In
Korea, X earns the Korean source a taxable income of $200,000 and
Y earns the U.S. source a taxable income of $200,000.
$200
Assume
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further that the Korean income tax rate is thirty percent and U.S.
income tax rate is thirty percent.
Thus, X pays a tax of $120,000 [($200,00017 + $200,00018) x
30%] to the Korean government, and Y pays a tax of $60,000
($200,00019 x 30%) to the U.S. government. So, the total income tax
paid by both X and Y is $180,000 and the net income of both X and Y
is $220,000 [($200,000 + $200,000) – $180,000].
However, if the Korean government allows X a foreign tax credit
of $60,000 against the income tax paid to the U.S. government by Y
under the Korea-U.S. Tax Treaty, the total income tax paid by both X
and Y is $120,000 [($200,000 + $200,000) x 30% + $60,00020 $60,00021], and the net income of both X and Y is $280,000
[($200,000 + $200,000) - $120,000]. This foreign tax credit of
$60,000 against the U.S. source income protects X from “double
taxation” on the U.S. source income.
As demonstrated above, if this credit were not in place, X and Y
would pay 60% (30% + 30%) of income tax on the U.S. source
income of $200,000, and such double taxation would hinder crossborder transactions. Therefore, to drive global economic
development, it is crucial that the global community promote the
extension of a network of tax treaties to eliminate double taxation of
cross-border transactions.22
c) Taxing Rights
While extending FTAs, promoting a network of tax treaties, and
building up a legal structure to promote growth in the global
economy is important, another problem remains. Where free trade
increases by eliminating trade barriers, disputes between trading
states over taxing rights are likely to become very heated. To solve
this problem, the global community should attempt to alleviate taxing
rights competition.
The right to tax is generally affected by international tax law, not
domestic tax law. Thus, as trade barriers are eliminated, it is expected
that each state will enlarge the scope of taxing rights by
strengthening its international tax law. Today, most international tax
issues (residency, permanent establishment, withholding tax on
dividends, interest, royalty, capital gains, other income, etc.) are
resolved through standardized tax treaties between related states. The

17

Korean source taxable income.
U.S. source taxable income.
19
U.S. source taxable income.
20
U.S. source tax: $200,000 x 30%.
21
Foreign tax credit allowed by the Korean government.
22
Tax treaties prevent both double taxation and fiscal evasion.
18
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provisions in these tax treaties allocate rights to tax based on the type
of transaction or income.
However, transfer pricing has always been a significant problem
in the field of international tax law. Because tax treaties do not
normally address the tax issues related to transfer pricing, states
generally rely on their domestic tax law or refer to OECD transfer
pricing guidelines to resolve transfer pricing matters. Moreover,
because dealing with transfer pricing requires a detailed analysis of
many variables (e.g. function, risk burden, market circumstance, and
character of goods or services), it is not easy to find a solution that
will satisfy both taxpayers and governmental tax authorities. Because
of these complexities, transfer pricing is becoming a large-scale
problem in the global community. When one state tries to
unreasonably exercise its taxation rights to secure additional fiscal
revenue, the situation becomes even more aggravated. Thus, it is
imperative that global organizations and the global community
attempt to address this growing and complex problem.
i)

Transfer Pricing Affecting Taxing Rights

States that execute FTAs will likely see their customs revenue
gradually decline and eventually disappear. Accordingly, as the level
of international trade increases, these states will likely exert greater
effort to secure fiscal revenue through strengthening taxation rights.
This would result in severe competition among states to tax
international transactions. In particular, competition for taxing rights
would likely lead tax authorities to increase their scrutiny of
transactions between multinational enterprises and their foreign
subsidiaries (i.e. transfer pricing). To illustrate why this would be the
likely outcome, consider the following example:
Assume that an automobile manufacturing parent company (A)
located in the U.S. conducts sales activities through a wholly-owned
subsidiary (B) in Korea. A manufactures a model of car (X) in the
U.S. and sells them to B in an arm’s length transaction for 40 million
South Korean Won (KRW). Further assume that, A incurs a cost of
30 million KRW to manufacturer X and that B sells X in Korea for 50
million KRW.
If no other expenses are incurred, A and B will each realize 10
million KRW in profit from each car sold,23 and therefore must report
this amount to the Korean and U.S. governments. If we assume that
the tax rate is 35% in the U.S. and 30% in Korea, A must pay the
U.S. government a tax of 3.5 million KRW per car (10 million KRW

23
A’s earnings = 40 million KRW – 30 million KRW. B’s earnings = 50 million KRW –
40 million KRW.
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x 35%), and B must pay the Korean Government a tax of 3 million
KRW per car (10 million KRW x 30%).
Since B was established based on Korean business law, it is an
entity legally independent and separate from A, which was
established pursuant to U.S. business law. However, since B deals
only with goods manufactured by A and is under the control of A
with respect to business activities in Korea, both can be economically
considered as one integrated entity. As such, even if A determines to
sell the car to B at a price exceeding the arm’s length price of 40
million KRW, B could not object to this determination. Thus, if A
transacts with B at 43 million KRW per car, A will realize 13 million
KRW of profit on each car whereas B will only realize 7 million
KRW of profit on each car. Accordingly, for each car sold, A will pay
4.55 million KRW in taxes24 to the U.S. government, while B will
pay 2.1 million KRW in taxes25 to the Korean government.
A’s tax payment to the
U.S. government

B’s tax payment to
the Korean
government

Trade at arm’s
length

3,500,000 KRW

3,000,000 KRW

Trade at non-arm’s
length

4,550,000 KRW

2,100,000 KRW

Difference

+ 1,050,000 KRW

- 900,000 KRW

Therefore, at a selling price of 43 million KRW per car, the U.S.
government will collect an additional 1.05 million KRW in tax per
car, while the Korean government loses 0.9 million KRW in tax per
car. Where 100,000 X model cars are sold at non-arm’s length price,
the tax loss of the Korean government would be 90 billion KRW
(900,000 KRW x 100,000 cars). Thus, to prevent great financial loss
to governments, each state would be highly incentivized to try and
secure its taxation rights by scrutinizing intra-company transactions
of multinational enterprises.
ii) Equity of Taxing Rights between States

24
25

13 million KRW x 35%.
7 million KRW x 30%.
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The role of a state’s tax authority must change as globalization
increases. Although tax authorities traditionally focus on maintaining
fairness among individual taxpayers, as globalization increases, tax
authorities should also strive to maintain fairness among taxing rights
of the states. To aid states with this additional burden, the global
community must promote the research and development of a system
designed to maintain equity, not only between individual taxpayers,
but between states as well. This system will require tax authorities to
shift their approach to tax issues, primarily from a micro-perspective
to a macro-perspective.26
The general principle for determining taxpayer fairness is fairly
simple: taxpayers who have the same income bear the same tax
burden. However, the general principle for determining fairness
between states is slightly more complex: a taxpayer’s mixed profit
earned by engaging in cross-border transactions with related overseas
parties should be allocated to each state based largely on the function
performed and risk burden assumed by the taxpayer in each state.27
Because this is a transfer pricing issue, the market conditions and the
character of goods or services can be considered when necessary.
For example, a taxpayer in State A engaging in a cross-border
transaction with related overseas parties located in States B and C,
realizes 100 million USD of mixed profit in these three states. The
taxing rights on this mixed profit should be allocated to A, B, and C
on the basis of the function performed and risk burden assumed by
the taxpayer in A, B, and C.28 Otherwise, the door is open for
manipulating and infringing upon the taxing rights of each state.
Consequently, the global community must pay more attention to the
fairness of taxing rights between states by developing more
reasonable allocation rules based on function and risk burden.
iii) Abstention from Unreasonable Exercise of Taxing Rights
In cross-border transactions, when one state exercises its taxing
rights unreasonably, it infringes upon the taxing rights of another
state. To illustrate, recall the transfer pricing example above where
26
See Sung-Soo Han, Strategic Approach toward the Amendment of the Korea-U.S. Tax
Treaty 41 (2008) (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Seoul), available at
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1009&context=sung_soo_han (in Korean
only).
27
Every transaction between related parties, including those involving goods, services,
interest, royalties, etc., can produce a mixed profit.
28
Taxpayers normally pay taxes to the government as consideration for protection of their
business activities. If a multinational enterprise doing world-wide business realized $100,000 of
mixed profit in countries A, B, and C, and it incurred $20,000 in expenses in A (reflecting its
function and risk burden), $30,000 of expenses in B, and $50,000 of expenses in C, it would be
reasonable that $100,000 in mixed profits be allocated to A, B, and C based on their expenses as
follows: $20,000 [$100,000 x $20,000 / ($20,000 + $30,000 + $50,000)] to A, $30,000 to B,
and $50,000 to C.
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we assumed that the arm’s-length price between A and B for one
model X car was 40 million KRW. In that example, what if the U.S.
tax authority argued that A should have sold model X cars to B at the
greater-than-arm’s-length price of 43 million KRW, and then
unilaterally exercised its taxing rights on that basis? The likely result
would be a unilateral infringement upon the taxing rights of the
Korean tax authority.
Additionally, multinational enterprises performing cross-border
transactions might manipulate the transaction price with related
overseas parties (such as their subsidiaries) to reduce their overall tax
burden. Since this type of price manipulation affects the taxing
rights of states, tax authorities will generally scrutinize cross-border
transactions of multinational enterprises. However, even when
multinational enterprises believe that their cross-border transactions
were conducted at an arm’s-length price, a states’ tax authority may
not always acknowledge the transaction price determined by these
multinational enterprises during a tax audit. Accordingly,
multinational enterprises are normally uncertain as to what tax
authorities will determine is the arm’s-length price.
Thus, states that unreasonably exercise their taxing rights, and
consider only their own fiscal revenue, often harm multinational
enterprises. Accordingly, states should abstain from the unreasonable
exercise of their taxing rights and the global community should
promote bilateral or multilateral Advance Pricing Agreements
(APAs) and introduce much clearer transfer pricing rules such as
“adjustment on the uncontrolled effect of foreign exchange rate,” and
the “use of multiple year data,” discussed below.
iv) Promotion of Advance Pricing Agreements
It is in a taxpayer’s best interest to enter into bilateral or
unilateral APAs. Entering into APAs with tax authorities can prevent
transfer pricing audits and therefore can protect a taxpayer from
unreasonable transfer pricing adjustments. However, problems arise
where there is no tax treaty between two related states. Without a tax
treaty, it is impossible to execute a bilateral APA to prevent
unreasonable transfer pricing adjustments from either or both tax
authorities. Of course, even in the absence of a tax treaty, it is
possible for a taxpayer to execute a unilateral APA with one state’s
tax authority. Though, a unilateral APA would not protect a taxpayer
from a transfer pricing adjustment instigated by another state. Thus,
to further the development of the global community, countries must
promote bilateral APAs. But, because bilateral APAs are only
possible where there is a tax treaty, the global community should first
promote the extension of a network of tax treaties.
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Nonetheless, transfer pricing is an issue best settled by tax
authorities, rather than taxpayers, since transfer pricing affects the
taxing rights of each state. From the standpoint of a taxpayer, it does
not matter whether one state imposes more taxing rights than another
state as long as the taxpayer’s overall tax burden is the same. To
illustrate, consider the following example:
Assume that a U.S. company (A) sells a car (X) to its Korean
branch (B) at 40 million KRW. Its manufacturing cost in the U.S.
market is 30 million KRW, and the selling price in the Korean
market is 50 million KRW. Also, assume that both the U.S. and
Korean income tax rates are 30%. Assuming that there are no other
expenses related to this transaction, A would realize 10 million KRW
(40 million KRW – 30 million KRW) in income and B would realize
10 million KRW (50 million KRW – 40 million KRW) in income.
The combined income tax paid by both A and B would be 6 million
KRW [(10 million KRW + 10 million KRW) x 30%].29
Now suppose that A sells X to B at 45 million KRW. As a result,
A would realize 15 million KRW (45 million KRW – 30 million
KRW) in income, and B would receive 5 million KRW (50 million
KRW – 45 million KRW) in income. Here, the total income tax paid
by both A and B is 6 million KRW [(15 million KRW + 5 million
KRW) x 30%], which is the same as the above example.
Thus, if the total tax burden is the same, there is no reason a
taxpayer would manipulate the transfer price between related parties.
Nevertheless, this issue is still relevant for taxpayers because they
could face unreasonable transfer pricing adjustments where two tax
authorities have different tax arrangements. This serves to support the
concept illustrated above that transfer pricing is an issue that should
be managed and resolved by the relevant states’ tax authorities rather
than by taxpayers. In other words, tax authorities should pay more
attention to the transfer pricing issue than taxpayers and should
actively seek out and execute, at its own expense, bilateral or
multilateral APAs with other contracting states.
The APA statistics for Korea, which introduced a transfer pricing
regime in 1996, are as follows30:

29
30
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For simplicity, an explanation of foreign tax credits is omitted.
S.Kor. Nat’l Tax Serv., APA ANNUAL REPORT (2008) (on file with author).
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Unilateral APA
Received

Processed

Bilateral APA

Total

Pending

Received

Processed

Pending

Received

Processed

Pending

9

24

10

14

33

10

23

2002

9

2003

3

2

10

4

3

15

7

5

25

2004

6

7

9

10

3

22

16

10

31

2005

15

4

20

10

3

29

25

7

49

2006

12

8

24

12

16

25

24

24

49

2007

19

13

30

13

7

31

32

20

61

2008

13

16

27

22

14

39

35

30

66

Total

77

50

95

56

172

106

The APA statistics for Japan, which introduced a transfer pricing
regime in 1986, are as follows31:
By 2004

By 2005

By 2006

By 2007

By 2008

Applied

51

76

92

93

111

Completed

34

32

72

70

70

Carriedover

160

204

224

247

288

Considering the number of APA renewals and the number of
multinational enterprises in existence, the APA statistics above
indicate that administration and utilization of APAs is now more
important than ever.
v) Uncontrolled Effect of Foreign Exchange Rate
Every cross-border transaction is affected by foreign exchange
rates. Foreign exchange rates can affect the appropriateness of
transfer pricing methodologies. Because transfer pricing affects the
taxing rights of each state, and the appropriateness of transfer pricing
31
Data provided by Kazufumi Limori in presentation at IFA China, Japan and Korea Tax
Conference, in Seoul, Korea (May 19 - 20, 2010) (on file with author).

90

INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW

VOLUME 7

between related parties is determined by an arm’s-length price, it is
necessary to determine an arm’s-length price. If an arm’s-length price
could be accurately determined, it would not be difficult to maintain
fair taxing rights between related states.
The 2009 OECD transfer pricing guidelines describe various
transfer pricing methods, including traditional transaction methods
and transactional profit methods. Traditional transaction methods
include the “comparable uncontrolled price method” (CUP), “resale
price method,” and “cost plus method.” Transactional profit methods
include the “profit split method” and “transactional net margin
method” (TNMM).32
According to the OECD guidelines, in order to use any of the
traditional transaction methods, one of the following two conditions
must be met: “(1.) none of the differences (if any) between the
transactions being compared or between the enterprises undertaking
those transactions [can] materially affect the price in the open
market; or (2.) reasonably accurate adjustments can be made to
eliminate the material effects of such differences.”33
Conversely, the transactional profit method does not require any
conditions to be met. The transactional profit method, as mentioned
above, is divided into two methods: (1) the profit split method and
(2) the transactional net margin method. “One strength of the profit
split method is that it generally does not rely directly on closely
comparable transactions, and it can therefore be used in cases when
no such transactions between independent enterprises can be
identified.”34 The strength of the transactional net margin method is
that “net margins (e.g. return on assets, operating income to sales,
and possibly other measures of net profit) are less affected by
transactional differences than is the case with price, as used in the
CUP [m]ethod.”35
In reality, it is practically impossible to compare companies
doing identical or substantially similar transactions in terms of
function, risk burden, and character of goods or services. For this
reason, the transactional profit method is used more frequently than
the traditional transaction method to allocate the taxing rights of each
country. In addition, because the transactional profit method
normally allows a certain level of taxing rights, tax authorities tend to

32
See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES FOR
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND TAX ADMINISTRATIONS 52-65, 68-81 (2009),
http://browse.oecdbookshop.org/oecd/pdfs/browseit/2309111E.PDF
[hereinafter
2009
TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES].
33
Id. at 53, 55, 60.
34
Id. at 69.
35
Id. at 75.
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prefer this method, unless, of course, the traditional transaction
method allows for more taxing rights.
Although each state’s tax authority prefers the transactional
profit method for the more convenient transfer pricing administration
that it provides, changes in foreign exchange rates, which cannot be
controlled by a taxpayer, can negatively affect the appropriateness of
this method unless a proper foreign exchange rate adjustment is
made. Foreign exchange rates can, of course, also affect the
appropriateness of using other transfer pricing methodologies, such
as the comparable uncontrolled price method, the resale price
method, and the cost plus method. In other words, since foreign
exchange rates affect every cross-border transaction, it must be
studied very closely and objectively in order to prevent arbitrary
taxation. Since the transactional net margin method (TNNM) is
perhaps the most frequently used method, the effects of foreign
exchange rates under this method as well as a reasonable approach to
countering these effects are discussed below.36
(1) Change of Import Price and Profit
As stated above, a change in foreign exchange rates can greatly
affect the international price of goods. Furthermore, because a private
enterprise cannot control changes in the foreign exchange rate, it
faces unexpected profits or losses when the foreign exchange rate
changes substantially. To illustrate this concept, consider the
following example:
Assume that in the second half of 2007, a German company (X)
made a business decision to sell its product (Z) to its Korean
distributor (Y) at the price of 20 Euros in 2008, and that the
forecasted average foreign exchange rate for 2008 is 1200 KRW per
one Euro. Thus, if the foreign exchange rate does not change between
2007 and 2008, the import price paid by Y to X in the year 2008 will
be 24,000 KRW (20 Euros x 1200 KRW).
However, if the foreign exchange rate increases to 1500 KRW
per 1 Euro in the year 2008, the import price paid by Y to X in the
year 2008 becomes 30,000 KRW (20 Euros x 1500 KRW). Thus, Y
will pay an additional 6000 KRW (30,000 KRW – 24,000 KRW) for
the goods because of the change in foreign exchange rates.
Accordingly, Y’s operating profit decreases by 6000 KRW. Thus,
variations in foreign exchange rates can greatly affect an enterprise’s
profit.
(2) Adjustment of Foreign Exchange Rate

36

The same approach would be applied to other TP methodologies.

92

INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW

VOLUME 7

The table below shows trends in foreign exchange rates from
2002 to 2008.37
Foreign Exchange Rate Trend (Average Buyer’s Rate / Euro: KRW)
Unit: KRW
2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

Jan.

1189.69

1276.03

1522.63

1390.87

1218.58

1241.18

1413.79

Feb.

1169.53

1308.65

1503.20

1360.45

1182.77

1249.52

1423.19

Mar.

1181.80

1357.41

1458.46

1355.06

1196.16

1274.23

1549.75

Apr.

1191.46

1365.47

1408.77

1344.79

1193.16

1282.67

1585.99

May

1183.91

1419.96

1440.27

1297.13

1255.56

1279.06

1646.67

June

1192.68

1421.00

1435.31

1253.51

1232.73

1269.69

1633.60

July

1199.38

1372.22

1449.01

1274.36

1230.21

1285.10

1638.70

Aug.

1193.02

1340.64

1440.17

1279.45

1255.08

1297.71

1592.63

Sept.

1208.37

1334.89

1428.87

1287.21

1239.03

1316.88

1659.93

Oct.

1241.91

1392.66

1457.08

1283.02

1226.37

1329.20

1800.44

Nov.

1237.96

1413.08

1444.46

1253.47

1229.30

1372.38

1804.09

Dec.

1254.77

1439.15

1436.62

1238.19

1247.12

1382.21

1882.82

19.0%

-0.2%

-13.82%

0.7%

10.8%

36.22%

% Change

The table above shows that the foreign exchange rate increased
19% from 2002 to 2003. Applying these real world numbers to our
hypothetical would mean that the import price of Y in 2003 increased
19%, resulting in a significant decrease in Y’s operating margin.38
Accordingly, if Y’s operating margin decreases solely because of an
increase in the foreign exchange rate, bringing it out of an arm’slength range under TNMM, the negative effect on operating margin
37
KOREA EXCHANGE BANK, http://www.keb.co.kr/IBS/goContents.jsp?co (last visited
Feb. 18, 2011). Note that the fluctuation rate is based on the rate in December of the previous
year.
38
Since the foreign exchange rate increased 36.22% in 2008 compared to 2007, it would
result in a larger decrease in Y’s operating margin.
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caused by the change of foreign exchange rate should be adjusted
through transfer pricing. To illustrate, consider both the above and
the table below, which lists the operating margins for a hypothetical
target company as well as the arm’s-length range for operating
margins of several comparable companies:39
2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

Average

Upper
quartile

8.385%

9.683%

3.823%

6.658%

8.613%

7.726%

Median

5.004%

8.076%

3.501%

4.555%

6.673%

6.056%

Lower
quartile

2.928%

5.648%

2.095%

3.053%

4.558%

3.223%

Target
company

4.136%

3.170%

4.622%

8.017%

7.275%

5.444%

In 2003, for example, the foreign exchange rate increased 19%
and affected the import price and thus the operating margin of the
target company. In fact, the target company’s operating margin in
2003 (3.170%) is lower than the arm’s-length range during that same
year (5.648%~9.683%). If the foreign exchange rate had not
increased 19% in 2003, the target company’s operating margin would
have been within the arm’s arm’s-length range.
Furthermore, observe that the target company’s operating
margins in fiscal years 2004 and 2005 exceeded the upper quartile of
an arm’s-length range. It would be very unreasonable and unfair if a
tax authority only made a transfer pricing adjustment in 2003.
Accordingly, in terms of transfer pricing, a tax authority should
adjust the operating margin of the target company in each year by
eliminating the amount of profit/loss caused by fluctuations in
foreign exchange rates that are beyond the arm’s-length range.
Of course, if fluctuations in foreign exchange rates affect the
operating margins of a target company and comparable companies to
the same degree, it would not be necessary to adjust the operating
margin of the target company. The foreign exchange rate should be
adjusted only when it would lead to a more reasonable result.40
Adjusting transfer pricing without adjusting the foreign exchange
39
The statute of limitations on tax audits is normally five years in Korea. Thus, the tax
authority scrutinizes five-year data at the time of a TP audit.
40
Since the facts and circumstances surrounding each company’s transactions differ, the
foreign exchange adjustment should be made in the most reasonable way—on a case-by-case
basis.
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rate would result in an arbitrary double taxation. Because OECD
transfer pricing guidelines do not currently have a clear rule
pertaining to the effects of foreign exchange rate fluctuations, the
OECD should consider introducing such a transfer pricing rule to
prevent unilateral and arbitrary TP adjustment.
(3) Use of Multi-Year Data
Information pertaining to foreign exchange rate adjustments is
often not available because there is no readily accessible data
showing the effect of foreign exchange rates on comparable
companies. Under such circumstances, it is best to use multiple year
data to determine the appropriateness of transfer pricing.
Furthermore, foreign exchange rates are often cyclical—that is, they
move up and down over the years. A portion of the table above,
entitled “Foreign Exchange Rate Trend (Average Buyer’s Rate /
Euro: KRW),” has been inserted below to show the cyclical nature of
exchange rates.
2002
% Change

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

19.0%

-0.2%

-13.82%

0.7%

10.8%

36.22%

The Foreign Exchange Rate Trend table excerpt above shows
that, although the target company’s operating margin in the year
2003 is below the arm’s length range, its operating margins in the
year 2004 and the year 2005 exceed the arm’s length range. As a
result, its five-year average operating margin is within the arm’s
length range, and therefore it would not be reasonable to make an
additional adjustment in 2003. Thus, because foreign exchange rates
are often cyclical, it is crucial that tax authorities us multi-year data
when reviewing the appropriateness of transfer pricing arrangements.
OECD Transfer Pricing guideline 3.44 states:
Multiple year data should be considered in the
transactional net margin method for both the
enterprise under examination and independent
enterprises to the extent their net margins are being
compared, to take into account the effects on profits
of product life cycles and short term economic
conditions. For example, multiple year data could
show whether the independent enterprises that
engaged in comparable uncontrolled transactions
had suffered from the effects of market conditions in
the same way and over a similar period as the
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associated enterprise under examination. Such data
could also show whether similar business patterns
over a similar length of time affected the profits of
comparable independent enterprises in the same way
as the enterprise under examination.41
Unfortunately, the abstract nature of this rule makes it hard to
apply or understand, and leads to controversy regarding its
construction. Moreover, the tendency of some tax authorities to treat
this rule merely as a non-mandatory guideline further complicates the
issue. Thus, the OECD should clarify this rule to make it more
effective.
vi) Prevention of
Transactions

Tax

Avoidance

Through

Roundabout

As discussed earlier, the competition for taxing rights between
related states could increase once trade barriers are eliminated. The
global community should take a systematic approach to prevent the
discouragement of cross-border transactions that can result from
competition over taxing rights between states. In addition, to prevent
double taxation and tax avoidance tactics, each state should actively
create new tax treaties or supplement existing tax treaties.
A large part of the problem occurs when taxpayers engaged in
cross-border transactions infringe upon the taxation rights of related
states by shopping for loopholes in tax treaties. Treaty shopping is
performed through roundabout transactions, which frustrate the
intended equality of taxing rights between partners. Thus, it is
imperative that the global community establish a common set of rules
to prevent these kinds of roundabout transactions.
Comments to Article 1 of the 2008 OECD Model Tax
Convention on Income and on Capital recommend various rules to
prevent the improper use of the Convention.42 These rules include:
i) provisions aimed at conduit companies,
ii) provisions aimed at entities benefiting from preferential
tax regimes,
iii) provisions aimed at particular types of income,
iv) anti-abuse rules dealing with source taxation of specific
types of income, and

41

2009 TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES, supra note 32, at 80.
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND
CAPITAL
(CONDENSED
VERSION)
45-63
(2008),
ON
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/32/41147804/pdf [hereinafter COMMENTARY TO MODEL TAX
CONVENTION].
42
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v) provisions aimed at preferential regimes introduced after
the signature of the convention.
The global community should pay special attention to
roundabout transactions performed through “conduit companies.”
Roundabout transactions result in an infringement of the taxation
rights of treaty partners not intended by the parties to the treaty.
Every state should implement a legal system to prevent such tax
avoidance strategies.
(1) Example of Roundabout Transactions Used for Tax
Avoidance43
[Issue]: Does the recipient of interest (X) in the following
scenario qualify as a “beneficial owner of interest”?
[Facts]: Due to the Korean financial crisis in 1997, a Korean
multinational company (A) decided to sell its Korean subsidiary (B),
Chinese subsidiaries (C and D), and a U.S. subsidiary (E) to a U.S.
fund.
The U.S. fund established X corporation in Hungary, Y
corporation in Luxembourg, Z corporation in the British Virgin
Islands and then provided the funding necessary for the operation of
these corporations.
Z borrowed $300 million from a U.S. investment bank and
loaned or invested it as follows:
-

Capital investment to X: $29 million
Capital investment to Y: $15,000
Loan to Y: $116 million
Loan to another British Virgin Islands company: $121
million
Loan to C and D: $34 million

Subsequently, Y loaned the $116 million borrowed from Z to X,
and X loaned $145 million ($116 million borrowed from Y with the
$29 million invested from Z) to B (the Korean subsidiary)—the
above transactions taking place almost simultaneously.
According to the loan agreement between X and B, B paid
11.72% of interest to X, whereas X paid 11.47% of interest to Y.
Thus, X realized the 0.25%44 difference as profit. Altogether, X
realized i) $3,398,80045 in income by loaning its own capital to B,

43

Id.
11.72% less 11.47%.
45
$29,000,000 x 11.72%.
44
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and ii) $290,00046 in income by loaning the funds borrowed from Z
to B every year. X paid a 3% corporate tax on its income to the
Hungarian government.
[Position of Korean tax authority]: Since X is a mere conduit
company, X cannot enjoy the benefit of Article 11 of the KoreaHungary Tax Treaty47. Therefore, Article 13 of the Korea-U.S. Tax
Treaty should apply where a beneficial owner of interest resides, and
B is obligated to withhold a 12% tax from the interest amount paid to
X.48
(2) Anti-avoidance Rule
If there is no clear anti-avoidance rule preventing roundabout
transactions, taxpayers will continue to exploit this loophole in tax
treaties to avoid taxes. Further, the absence of a clear anti-avoidance
rule greatly increases the likelihood of tax disputes between
taxpayers and tax authorities due to the ambiguity of the rule. Thus,
if anti-tax avoidance rules are not universally applied, it will be
impossible to prevent tax avoidance through roundabout transactions.
- Introduction of Anti-avoidance Rules into Domestic Tax Law As illustrated above, tax avoidance through roundabout
transactions is possible by taking advantage of loopholes in tax
treaties with third party states. In other words, even if a treaty signed
between two states has no loophole that would permit tax avoidance
tactics, an enterprise may still avoid payment of taxes and circumvent
the treaty by exploiting loopholes extant in other treaties with third
party states. Therefore, a state that wants to prevent tax avoidance
should insert an anti-avoidance rule in its tax treaty with every
related and third party state. Even if only one tax treaty has a
loophole, this loophole can circumvent every other tax treaty that
does not have one.
For example, although Korea has executed seventy-three tax
treaties to date, if there is a loophole in one tax treaty (such as in the
Hungary example above), this loophole can incapacitate the KoreaU.S. Tax Treaty as well as other Korean tax treaties. Therefore, as
illustrated by this example, the Korean tax authority needs a unified
46

$116,000,000 x 0.25(11.72-11.47).
See Korea-Hungary Tax Treaty art. 11, para. 1, Kor.-Hung., Mar. 29, 1989 (providing
that “Interest arising in a Contracting State and paid to a resident of the other Contracting State
shall be taxable only in that other State.”).
48
See id. at art. 11, para 1, 2. (“Paragraph 1: Interest derived from sources within one of
the Contracting States by a resident of the other Contracting State may be taxed by both
Contracting States. Paragraph 2: The rate of tax imposed by one of the Contracting States on
interest derived from sources within that Contracting State by a resident of the other
Contracting State shall not exceed 12 per cent of the gross amount.”).
47
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tax treaty policy in order to prevent tax avoidance through
roundabout transactions. However, because it is not practical to
amend all existing tax treaties at the same time, it is necessary to
introduce anti-avoidance rules into domestic tax laws. The OECD
has stated that anti-tax avoidance provisions in international tax
treaties allow for such domestic anti-avoidance rules.49
- Beneficial Owner Rule of the U.S.-Japan Tax Treaty Anti-avoidance rules must be drafted clearly for both tax
authorities and taxpayers. If not, unnecessary disputes between tax
authorities and taxpayers can arise. The U.S.-Japan Tax Treaty,
revised on November 6, 2006, introduced the “clear beneficial
owner” rule to prevent roundabout transactions in relation to the
payment of dividends (Article 10), interest (Article 11), royalties
(Article 14), and other income (Article 21).50 Paragraph 11, Article
11 of the U.S.-Japan Tax Treaty provides:
A resident of a Contracting State shall not be considered
the beneficial owner of interest in respect of a debt-claim
if such debt-claim would not have been established
unless a person:
(a)

(b)

that is not entitled to benefits with respect to
interest arising in the other Contracting State
which are equivalent to, or more favorable
than, those available under this Convention to
a resident of the first-mentioned Contracting
State; and
that is not a resident of either Contracting
State; held an equivalent debt-claim against
the first-mentioned resident.51

49
See COMMENTARY TO MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 42, at 49, 58
(Commentary 9.2 provides, “[T]o the extent these anti-avoidance rules are part of the basic
domestic rules set by domestic tax laws for determining which facts give rise to a tax liability,
they are not addressed in tax treaties and are therefore not affected by them. Thus, as a general
rule, there will be no conflict between such rules and the provisions of tax conventions.”
Commentary 9.4 provides, “Under both approaches, therefore, it is agreed that States do not
have to grant the benefits of a double taxation convention where arrangements that constitute
an abuse of the provisions of the convention have been entered into.” Finally, commentary 22.1
provides, “Such rules are part of the basic domestic rules set by domestic tax laws for
determining which facts give rise to a tax liability; these rules are not addressed in tax treaties
and are therefore not affected by them.”).
50
See Convention between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Japan for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Japan Tax Treaty, U.S.-Japan, arts. 10, 11, 14,
21, Nov. 6, 2006, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/japan.pdf [hereinafter U.S.-Japan Tax Treaty].
51
U.S.-Japan Tax Treaty, supra note 50, at art. 11, para. 11. See also U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE CONVENTION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
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The operation of this rule can be illustrated by the following
example:
A, a U.S. resident, holds a debt-claim against X, a Japanese
company which entitles A to interest of 10x each year. B, a resident
of a third country that does not have a tax treaty with Japan, holds a
debt-claim against A that entitles B to interest of 10x each year and
otherwise has terms that are equivalent to the terms of the debt-claim
held by A. Furthermore, A would not have an established debt-claim
against X if B did not hold a debt-claim against A. X pays interest of
10x to A, who then pays interest of 10x to B. Under paragraph 11, A
will not be considered the beneficial owner of the interest from X,
and is therefore not entitled to treaty benefits with respect to the
interest from X.52
If this kind of clear anti-avoidance rule is introduced into all tax
treaties or domestic tax laws, it is possible to prevent tax avoidance
activities through roundabout transactions. For instance, if this rule
was applied to the Hungary example above, X would not be a
beneficial owner of interest since X just passed on to B the $116
million borrowed from Y.
- Limitation on Beneficial Owner Rule of the U.S.-Japan Tax
Treaty In addition to the beneficial owner rule, the U.S.-Japan Tax
Treaty, revised on November 6, 2006, introduced the “limitation on
benefits” (LOB) rule.53 Paragraph 1, Article 22 of the U.S.-Japan Tax
Treaty provides:
AND JAPAN FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE TAXATION AND THE PREVENTION OF FISCAL
EVASION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL GAINS, SIGNED AT
WASHINGTON NOVEMBER 6, 2003 55 (2004), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/japante04.pdf.
52
See Technical Explanation of the Convention Between the United States and Japan for
the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes
on Income and on Capital Gains, U.S.-Japan, art. 11, para. 11, Nov. 6, 2003. [hereinafter
Technical
Explanation
Between
the
U.S.
and
Japan],
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/tejapan04.pdf.
53
See U.S.-Japan Tax Treaty, supra note 50, at art. 22 and Technical Explanation between
the U.S. and Japan, supra note 52, at art.22, para. 1 (explaining the purpose of limitation on
benefits provisions such as Article 22 of the U.S.-Japan Treaty to be as follows: “The United
States views an income tax treaty as a vehicle for providing treaty benefits to residents of the
two Contracting States. The proper operation of a treaty requires that it apply to those that are
bona fide residents of one of the Contracting States for the purpose of being granted treaty
benefits. This principal [sic] has long been recognized. For example, the Commentaries to the
OECD Model authorize a tax authority to deny treaty benefits, under substance-over-form
principles, to a nominee in one Contracting State deriving income from the other on behalf of a
third-country resident. In addition, although the text of the OECD Model does not contain
express anti-abuse provisions, the Commentary to Article 1 contains an extensive discussion
regarding the appropriateness of such provisions in tax treaties in order to limit the ability of
third state residents to obtain treaty benefits. The United States holds strongly to the view that
tax treaties should include provisions that specifically prevent misuse of treaties by residents of
third countries. Consequently, all recent U.S. income treaties contain comprehensive Limitation
on Benefits provisions.”).
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Except as otherwise provided in this Article, a resident
of a Contracting State that derives income from the
other Contracting State shall be entitled to all the
benefits accorded to residents of a Contracting State for
a taxable year by the provisions of other Articles of this
Convention only if such resident satisfies any other
specified conditions for the obtaining of such benefits
and is either:
(a) an individual;
(b) a Contracting State, any political subdivision
or local authority thereof, the Bank of Japan or
the Federal Reserve Banks;
(c) a company, if:
(i) the principal class of its shares, and
any disproportionate class of its shares, is
listed or registered on a recognized stock
exchange specified in clause (i) or (ii) of
subparagraph (b) of paragraph 5 and is
regularly traded on one or more
recognized stock exchanges; or
(ii) at least 50 percent of each class of
shares in the company is owned directly
or indirectly by five or fewer residents
entitled to benefits under clause (i),
provided that, in the case of indirect
ownership, each intermediate owner is a
person entitled to the benefits of this
Convention under this paragraph.54

54
U.S.-Japan Tax Treaty, supra note 50, at art. 22 (explaining further that the remainder
of U.S.-Japan Treaty Article 22 limitation on benefits provision reads, “(d) a person described
in subparagraph (c) of paragraph 1 of Article 4;
(e) a pension fund, provided that as of the end of the prior taxable year more than 50
percent of its beneficiaries, members or participants are individuals who are residents of
either Contracting State; or (f) a person other than an individual, if: (i) residents that are
described in subparagraph (a), (b), (d) or (e), or clause (i) of subparagraph (c), own,
directly or indirectly, at least 50 percent of each class of shares or other beneficial
interests in the person, and (ii) less than 50 percent of the person’s gross income for the
taxable year is paid or accrued by the person in that taxable year, directly or indirectly, to
persons who are not residents of either Contracting State in the form of payments that are
deductible in computing its taxable income in the Contracting State of which it is a
resident (but not including arm’s length payments in the ordinary course of business for
services or tangible property and payments in respect of financial obligations to a
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What happens if the Korean tax authority introduces this LOB
rule into all tax treaties and domestic tax laws? If we assume that the
Korea-Hungary Tax Treaty has this LOB rule and it can be applied to
the Hungary case above, X falls within the definition of a corporation
provided in Subparagraph (c), Paragraph 1 of Article 22. However,
since the shares of X are owned 100% by Y and are not listed or
registered on a recognized stock exchange, it cannot satisfy the
requirements of (c)(i). In addition, it cannot satisfy the requirements
of (c)(ii) since X’s shares are not directly or indirectly owned by five
or fewer Hungarian residents. Therefore, X is not entitled to the
benefits of the Korea-Hungary Tax Treaty. Therefore, to prevent tax
avoidance through roundabout transactions, it is necessary to
introduce clear anti-avoidance rules into all tax treaties or domestic
tax laws.
2) From the Regulatory Perspective
The global financial and economic crisis of 2008 was a result of
the U.S. subprime mortgage loan debacle that drove many financial
institutions to bankruptcy and crippled the global economy. To
revive a badly ailing economy, the U.S. Democrat-controlled House
of Representatives approved a historically large $819 billion stimulus
bill on January 28, 2009, which focused on increased spending and
tax cuts. Some commentators now say that the U.S. government
should have instead focused on regulating the reckless economic
practices that led to the disaster.55
Today, the economic activities of the global community are more
closely integrated than ever. Thus, an ailing economy in one state can
easily spread to other states—the larger the economic ailment, the
larger the global effect. The U.S. subprime mortgage loan crisis is an
excellent example of the degree to which the global economy is
connected. Thus, the global community has a responsibility to pay
close attention to the issue of global economic integration when
considering economic development.
From a legal perspective, there should not be a substantial
difference between regulating the global community and regulating
an individual state in terms of preventing undesirable business
activities. The section below will discuss the topic of global
economic regulation from Korea’s perspective. However, instead of
taking a case-by case approach to global regulatory analysis (which is
the approach recommended for global regulators since different
commercial bank, provided that where such a bank is not a resident of a Contracting State
such payment is attributable to a permanent establishment of that bank situated in one of
the Contracting States.”).
55
See Anthony Faiola et al., What Went Wrong?, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2008, at A01.
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business areas require individually tailored rules), this Article will
focus on general principles for establishing regulation. For this
reason, the discussion of global economic regulation below is
focused on ascertaining and regulating problematic activities in terms
of social benefit, social expense, and corruption.
a) Regulation and Policy56
Our society is filled with regulation and the amount of regulatory
oversight seems to increase as society develops. Because regulatory
laws affect individuals and their activities, they make up a large and
essential part of national policy. The Korean Basic Law for
Administrative Regulation, Subparagraph 1, Paragraph 1, Article 2,
explains that the term “administrative regulation” refers to what is
provided in laws, municipal ordinances, and rules to restrain the
rights of the people and to impose responsibility upon the people so
that a nation or a local autonomous authority may achieve a specific
administrative purpose. Thus, according to the Korean Basic Law for
Administrative Regulation, everything that has an effect on the lives
of the people comes under the term “regulation.”
To illustrate how regulations affect the lives of people, consider
the following example: A person wanting to work in the intercity bus
transportation business needs to receive a license from the Minister
of Transportation. Moreover, a person who wants to engage in other
bus transportation related business must receive a license from the
Governor, according to Article 6 of the Automobile Transportation
Business Law and Article 13 of the Enforcement Ordinance of the
same law. The government has placed such a regulatory burden on
the passenger transportation business in order to increase its impact
on the national economy and to secure a certain level of safety.
However, in reality, since these regulations endow an administrative
agency with significant discretion, they have distorted the market
economy and have caused many problems.
Consider another example from the construction business:
Pursuant to Article 5 of the Construction Business Law, the Korean
government classifies construction projects as general construction,
specific construction, or technical construction projects and also
directly manages licensing of the construction business. From 1975
through the latter half of 1989, granting new licenses in the general
construction category was prohibited. After that time, new licenses
were issued every three years, removing a significant restraint on
56
The following three sections are excerpted and adapted from SUNG-SOO HAN, ROAD TO
DEMOCRATIC STATE WITHOUT CORRUPTION: REPORT BASED ON THE SYNTHETIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW,
TAX
AND
ECONOMY
50-51
(Istory
Inc.,
2003),
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=sung_soo_han.

103

WINTER 2010

Global Community

competition. However, problems arose when large construction
companies began setting up related companies to receive general
construction licenses from the government to avoid bottom-line
limitations established by the construction contract limitation system.
These related companies would, in turn, participate in small scale
construction to stay below the limitation.57 Thus, as can be seen by
this example, when the government retains the right to issue licenses,
the market does not maintain a perfectly competitive situation and
imperfect competition results. Also, the natural flow of the markets is
disrupted and many problems can occur as a result.
In a perfectly competitive market, each enterprise competes with
other enterprises, thus consumers can purchase goods or services at
lower prices. However, governmental intervention in a market, while
useful in preventing unnecessarily excessive competition, can
negatively affect a market by creating imperfect competition. A
government deciding whether to regulate could obtain the
information necessary to establish an effective policy by comparing
the economic benefits obtained through imperfect competition with
those obtained through perfect competition. It is worth noting that in
the early stages of economic development, imperfect competition can
be economically more beneficial than perfect competition. Thus,
some nations might consider setting up imperfect competition
policies.
b) The Effect of Regulation58
This section discusses the various effects regulation may have on
a society. For the purposes of this section, the term “policy” is
generally defined as a set of ideas or plans that is used as a basis for
making decisions, especially in politics, economics, or business.
Also, for the purposes of discussion, assume that a regulation can
produce three kinds of effects: (1) a “policy effect” when it produces
social benefit, (2) a “non-policy effect” when it incurs social cost,59
and (3) a “corruption effect” when it leads to corruption.60

Effect of Regulation
Policy Effect: 60%

Non-policy effect: 40%

57
JI-HONG KIM, THE COMPETITION PROMOTION OF CONSTRUCTION B USINESS AND
IMPROVEMENT OF GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION (1990) (on file with author).
58
See SUNG-SOO HAN, supra note 56, at 51-53.
59
This thesis evaluates “social cost” in terms of the economic efficiency of a rule and
distinguishes it from corruption in terms of connection to a bribe.
60
The following discussion assumes that the three kinds of effects can be quantified from
an economic perspective.
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A regulation positively influences society and becomes “good
policy” where its “policy effect” (social benefit) is greater than its
“non-policy effect” (social cost), as shown in the table above.
Conversely, a regulation negatively influences society and becomes
“bad policy” where the government decides to maintain the
regulation even when its “non-policy effect” (social cost) start to
outweigh its “policy effect” (social benefit).
However, in economic terms, one of the biggest regulatory
consequences is corruption that results in the course of licensing.
Since the right to issue a license is left to the discretion of an
administrative agency, if there is no mechanism to control such
discretion, the administrative agency will inevitably abuse its
discretion. Moreover, where the standards for licensing become
obscure, the possibility for corruption increases because
administrative agencies can exert more even greater discretion. In
fact, world history provides many examples of instances where
illegality and corruption have damaged the fundamental structure of a
national economy. Korea is one example.
Effect of Regulation
Policy Effect
(30%)

Non-policy Effect
(40%)

Corruption Effect
(30%)

As seen in the table above, where the non-policy effect of a
regulation is 10% larger than the policy effect and its corruption
effect is 30%, the aggregate negative effect on the national or global
economy is 40% (10% non-policy effect + 30% corruption effect).61
Thus, even where a regulation has a large policy effect, if the nonpolicy and corruption effect together are greater than the policy
effect, the regulation is not desirable because the non-policy and
corruption effect completely offset the policy effect.
Effect of Regulation
Policy
Effect(45%)

Non-policy Effect
(25%)

Corruption Effect
(30%)

61
In reality, it would be difficult to quantify each effect. However, to facilitate discussion,
each effect is stated here as a percentage.
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In another example above, although the policy effect of a
particular regulation is 20% greater than the non-policy effect, the
regulation has an overall negative effect on society because the
corruption effect is at 30%. Thus, to make the regulation desirable for
society, it is necessary to strengthen the policy effect and weaken the
non-policy and corruption effects. To accomplish this, the policy
effect must be strengthened by thoroughly reviewing the content of a
regulation and removing factors that can cause non-policy effects and
the corruption effect must be weakened by bolstering the internal
control system of an administrative agency.
As mentioned above, in Korea, after 1989, the government
allowed new construction licenses to be issued every three years,
which removed restraints on competition that existed under the old
regulatory scheme. However, since then, large construction
companies have illegally set up related companies to avoid the
bottom-line limitation established by the construction contract
limitation system and now participate in small-scale construction to
stay below the limitation. In this example, if the removal of restraints
on competition produces social benefits, the regulation permitting
such licensing does have a policy effect. Furthermore, because large
construction companies illegally participate in small-scale
construction, there is a corruption effect. The Korean government
could reduce this corruption effect by strengthening the internal
control system of the licensing agency to strictly monitor and
eliminate corrupt activities.
If a regulation has an adverse effect on society because its nonpolicy effect is greater than its policy effect, the problem can be
solved by reducing factors producing the non-policy effect and
increasing factors producing the policy effect. An additional and
perhaps better option is to simply abolish the regulation altogether.
However, what if a regulation, such as the one related to construction
licensing, has policy, non-policy, and corruption effects all at the
same time? Even if a regulation produces some corruption effect, it
may not be desirable to abolish it without considering its policy
effect. If a regulation has both a policy effect and a corruption effect,
the government could strengthen the policy effect by merely
removing the corruption effect. However, when a regulation has no
policy effect and only a corruption effect, it may be best for society if
the regulation were completely abolished. Finally, where the nonpolicy effect is greater than the policy effect and there is also a
corruption effect, the policy effect can be increased by removing the
corruption and non-policy effects.
How can a regulation’s corruption effect be removed?
Regulation-based corruption can be divided into two types. The first
type is where an administrative agency has too much discretion due
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to the regulation’s obscurity. In other words, vagueness allows for
excessive discretion which ultimately leads to corruption. In this
situation, discretion must be reduced to the greatest extent possible
by establishing detailed and elaborate administrative rules. The
second type of regulation-based corruption occurs when an
administrative agency receives a bribe in violation of a regulation. In
this case, an internal control system under which administrative
actions can be supervised and checked must be implemented.
c) The Need for a Systematic Mechanism62
In Korea, when people want to engage in business, they must
meet the requirements of the Fire Service Law, the Public Health
Law, and any related presidential decrees and enforcement
ordinances that apply to their particular place of business. These rules
function as prerequisites to obtaining a business license. If these
related rules are not satisfied, a business license cannot be obtained.
Naturally, because employees spend much of their time in their
workplace, the safety conditions of the workplace can greatly
influence the course of their lives. If an administrative agency does
not properly supervise and guide the economic activities of
businessmen, the possibility of dangerous conditions (e.g. fire)
occurring in the workplace increases, thereby increasing the potential
risk of injury or death. For this reason, administrative agencies often
actively intervene in the economic activities of the people to prevent
accidents from occurring.
In general, governments implement a regulation under the
assumption that they will benefit people. However, problems arise
when an administrative agency misuses the regulation causing the
social expense of the regulation to become larger than its social
benefit. When social expenses become larger than social benefits,
regulations lose their value. Korea provides yet another example to
illustrate this concept. In Korea, it is easier to meet the licensing
requirements to conduct business for a general saloon than it is for a
luxury saloon. Because of this, saloon business owners often obtain a
license for a general saloon but conduct their business as a luxury
saloon. Moreover, agency officers who are aware of this practice
often demand bribes from the business owners in exchange for
allowing their business to continue in this illegal manner. Thus,
corruption often occurs in situations where a person seeking a
business license does not meet the licensing requirements established
by law and is thus tempted to collude with an agency officer to obtain
the license. In addition, there are also instances where corruption
occurs merely because regulations are so obscure that they provide
62
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See SUNG-SOO HAN, supra note 56, at 53-54.
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administrative officers with significant wiggle room to arbitrarily
construe licensing requirements.
Although this portion of the Article has discussed the topic of
economic regulation using examples from Korea, the regulatory
mechanisms and concepts discussed above can and should be applied
to other countries as well as the global community at large. To
effectively alleviate regulatory problems in the global community, it
is imperative that the global community establish a common
regulatory mechanism that will increase social benefit, decrease
social cost, and eliminate corruption.
V. CONCLUSION
As the world becomes increasingly integrated through the
process of globalization, it has become increasingly important and
crucial to promote a global legal system and drive global economic
development. To do so, countries and international organizations
should promote the extension of FTAs and tax treaties, and find ways
to cooperatively deal with international tax issues, such as taxation
rights surrounding transfer pricing arrangements. Furthermore,
economic development is best achieved by conducting business
activities under a set of corresponding rules and regulations, states
and international organizations should strive to establish a common
regulatory mechanism that takes into account the social benefits and
costs of regulatory measures, as well as the potential for corruption.
The result of an international global economic and legal structure is
an environment in which nation states and their citizens can enjoy
economic prosperity and avoid the pitfalls of poor regulation and
governance.63

63
A related article written by this author will be published in the Spring 2011 issue of the
Brigham Young University International Law & Management Review. It will focus on the role
of domestic law and tax treaties in creating a global community and explore a mechanism for
harmonizing legal conflicts between tax treaties and domestic tax law.
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